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of uncertainty in his alcohol concentration result from his driving under 
influence prosecution. In his opening brief, he asked that the Idaho Supreme Court 
retain this case so that it could reconsider its decision in Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department 
of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 (2012), which incorrectly held that I.C. § 18-8004(4) 
("Subsection (4)") makes the measurement of uncertainty in alcohol concentration tests 
irrelevant to, and inadmissible in, DUI cases. In response, the State relies on red 
herrings, circular reasoning, and a clear misunderstanding of the science at issue here 
to argue that Elias-Cruz was correctly decided This reply brief discusses a handful of 
flaws and shortcomings in the State's arguments and Elias-Cruz's reasoning that 





Alcohol Concentration Test Results Because I.C. § 18-8004 And I.C. § 18-8004C 
Criminalize Driving With An Actual Alcohol Concentration Above The Legal Limit, Not 
Merely Driving With A Test Result Above The Legal Limit 
In his opening brief, Mr. Jones asked this Court to reexamine and overturn its 
decision in Elias-Cruz because that Court decided the meaning of Subsection (4) based 
on legislative history, without ever analyzing the plain, unambiguous language of 
Subsection (4), and because the plain language, legislative history, legislative purpose, 
and internal requirements of Subsection (4) itself undermine Elias-Cruz's interpretation 
of Subsection (4). 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Jones "has failed to show the Elias-Cruz 
decision is manifestly unjust and should be overturned." (Resp. Br., p. 12 (capitalization 
altered).) First, Mr. Jones argued that Elias-Cruz is manifestly wrong, not manifestly 
unjust (App. Br., p.7.) And the State's arguments in favor of Elias-Cruz-which rely 
primarily on red herrings, circular reasoning (Elias-Cruz is right because of Elias-Cruz), 
and a clear misunderstanding of the science at issue here-only highlight that Elias-
Cruz was incorrectly decided. 
Crucially, the majority of the State's arguments turn on Elias-Cruz's 
misinterpretation of the 1987 amendment to Subsection (4). The State claims that, by 
removing the language "is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the 
blood" from Subsection (4), the legislature not only removed the requirement that breath 
or urine results be converted to blood results (as Mr. Jones contends), but also 
rendered the driver's actual alcohol concentration irrelevant. As discussed at length in 
Mr. Jones's opening brief and reiterated in this reply brief, Elias-Cruz and the State 
3 
something into amendment is not there. This Court uld 
reverse 
in 
The Plain Language, Legislative Amendments, And Legislative Purpose Of The 
DUI Statutes Unequivocally Criminalize Driving With An Alcohol Concentration 
Above The Legal Limit, Not Merely A Test Result Above The Legal Limit 
The plain language and legislative history of LC. § 18-8004C(2) and Subsection 
(4) shows that Elias-Cruz misinterpreted those statutes. First, according to the plain 
language of Subsection (4), Subsection (4) it is merely a rule of evidence that allows the 
State to introduce certain alcohol concentration test results without a witness. (App. 
Br., pp.10-13.) Second, the 1987 amendment only removed the requirement that urine 
and breath results be converted to blood results; it did not change that the alcohol 
concentration, not merely the test result, is criminalized. (App. Br., pp.13-15.) Third, 
the statement of purpose to the 1987 amendment supports Mr. Jones's reading of the 
DUI statutes: "Section 18-8004 is amended to clarify the definition of alcohol 
concentration. An illegal concentration is required for a person to be in violation of the 
law." (See App. Br., p.13 (quoting App. Br., App'x A, p.6, Statement of Purpose, H.R. 
119, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987) (emphasis added)).) 
In its response brief, the State addresses the plain language and legislative 
history together, focusing the bulk of its argument on the legislative amendments and 
wholly failing to address the express legislative purpose of the 1987 amendment. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.12-16.) Regarding the plain language, the State only asserts that 
the language of Subsection (4), "combined with the plain language of I.C. § 18-
8004C(2), shows that 'alcohol concentration' refers only to the results of the particular 
4 
on (4). (Resp. Br., 1 5.) 
§ 1 
§ 18-8004C(2) criminalizes driving with "an alcohol concentration" 
"a test result") of at least .20, "as defined in subsection (4) ... as shown by analysis 
of his blood, urine, or breath . . . . (Emphasis added). Had the legislature intended to 
criminalize the mere fact of driving with a test result over .20, it would have said so. For 
example, I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a) allows the Department of Transportation to suspend a 
driver's license if, among other things. ''the person submitted to a test and the test 
results indicated an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances . . . (Emphasis added). Here, the legislature clearly criminalized driving 
with a particular alcohol concentration, which is shown by one of three different types of 
tests. It did not criminalize merely driving with a particular test result. 
In addressing the plain language, the State contends: "Without explanation 
[Mr.] Jones repeatedly adds the word 'actual' to create the phrase 'actual alcohol 
concentration,' which seems to denote actual or true blood alcohol concentration .... 
However, the word 'actual' does not appear in the relevant statutes. [Mr.] Jones' 
rephrasing of the statutory language is simply not accurate." (Resp. Br., p.13.) 
Mr. Jones only uses that term to distinguish the actual alcohol concentration in ones' 
blood, breath, or urine from a test result evidencing that alcohol concentration. Again, 
the DUI statutes criminalize driving with an "alcohol concentration," not driving with a 
"test result." This is important because, as undisputed by the State, a driver's actual 
alcohol concentration may vary by five percent from the test result. (R., p.92; 
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Therefore, Mr. Jones's test result of .207 means Mr. Jones is just as likely to 
.1 or 17 as he is an alcohol concentration 
'p. 
Regarding the 1987 amendment, the State claims that removing the language "is 
a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the blood" from Subsection ( 4) 
both removed the requirement that breath or urine results be converted to blood results 
and also rendered the driver's actual alcohol concentration irrelevant. (Resp. Br., p.15.) 
Before 1987, Subsection (4) read: 
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration 
is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in blood and shall be 
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic 
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-
seven (67) milliliters of urine. 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204. And after 1987, Subsection (4) read: 
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration 
shall be based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) 
cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or 
sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine .... 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). As discussed in Mr. Jones's opening brief, the 1987 amendments 
changed only the requirement that measurements of alcohol in urine or breath be 
converted into a measurement of alcohol in blood. 1 (App. Br., pp.13-15.) The State, 
relying exclusively on circular reasoning and Elias-Cruz, attempts to conflate that 
1 The State frames this argument as a concession on Mr. Jones's part. (See Resp. Br., 
p.14 (quoting App. Br., p.14).) Acknowledging the actual effect of the 1987 
amendments-which only changed the requirement that measurements of alcohol in 
urine or breath be converted into a measurement of alcohol in blood-is not a 
concession. Mr. Jones did not conceded-because the 1987 amendments did not 
change-that the DUI statutes still criminalize driving with an actual alcohol 
concentration above the legal limit, not merely driving with a test result above the legal 
limit. 
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change that is not reflected in the a 
result 
2 rt 
re-insert the phrase deleted by the 1987 amendment to [Subsection (4)]-'is a 
determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in blood . . "' (Resp. Br., p.15.) 
Given that Mr. Jones is not arguing that a breath or urine result still needs to be 
converted into a blood result-which was all that the 1987 amendments changed-
Mr. Jones's reading of the statute would not require the Court to re-insert the above 
language as the State claims. 
Similarly, the State questions what Mr. Jones meant when he used the term 
"body" when discussing the 1987 amendment. (See Resp. Br., p 14 (quoting App. 
Br., p.14 ("[T]his shows that the legislature intended to remove the requirement that 
measurements of alcohol in breath or urine be converted into measurements of alcohol 
in blood, but still keep the requirement that the driver have an alcohol concentration 
over a certain amount in his or her body. The State posits: "If ... 'body' refers to 
'breath, blood, and urine,' the only measurements of alcohol concentration possible are 
the test results produced by whatever type of analysis is performed. If there is some 
other measurement of alcohol concentration that is relevant, [Mr.] Jones has failed to 
identify it." (Resp. Br., p.14.) The State again overlooks the fact that the measurement 
of uncertainty-which gives a range of measurements of the actual alcohol 
2 The State also fails to explain how the 1987 amendments to I.C. § 18-8004(1 )-(3), 
which deleted "by weight, of alcohol in his blood' and inserted "an alcohol 
concentration" and "as defined in subsection (4) of this section," made only the test 
result relevant. (See app. Br., p.14.) 
7 
in a subjects blood, breath, or precisely "some other 
that is 
are all 
is in fact required by Subsection (4). (See App. Br., pp.15-17; see also infra pp.7-9.) 
Finally, the State repeatedly cites to Elias-Cruz's statement that, after the 1987 
amendment, "[t]here is nothing to which to compare the test results." (See Resp. 
Br., pp.14 n.9, 17, 18 (quoting Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204).) This statement seems to 
indicate that, before 1987, the test results were compared to the alcohol concentration 
in the blood. This is incorrect. Again, because the pre-1987 Subsection (4) provided 
that alcohol concentration "is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the 
blood," Subsection (4) required that breath and urine results be converted to blood 
results. There was thus no "comparison" to be made. And, regardless of the 1987 
amendment, the test results still attempt to measure the actual alcohol concentration in 
a driver's body-whether measured by urine, breath, or blood. 
The plain language of the DUI statutes, as well as the legislative amendments 
and purpose, allow for only one reading of those statutes. I.C. § 18-8004C(2) and 
Subsection (4) criminalizes driving with an "alcohol concentration" above .20, not merely 
driving with a test result above .20. 
B. Elias-Cruz's Reading Of Subsection (4) Nullifies Subsection (4)'s Requirement 
That Alcohol Concentration Tests Comply With Certain Standard Operating 
Procedures, Which In Turn Require That Alcohol Concentration Test Results 
Include The Measurement Of Uncertainty 
The internal inconsistencies created by Elias-Cruz's reading of Subsection (4) 
further show Elias-Cruz misinterpreted Subsection (4). Specifically, Subsection (4) itself 
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that alcohol concentration include 
in 1 
The State counters that Elias-Cruz has not nullified parts of Subsection (4) by 
rendering the requirements of the standard operating procedures irrelevant The State 
first claims that "it was the Idaho Legislature, not the Idaho Supreme Court, which 
rendered the margin of error and measurement of uncertainty irrelevant and 
inadmissible in court." (Resp. Br., p.17.) The State's arguments on this point depend 
on its earlier arguments about the effect of the 1987 amendments, and thus fail for the 
same reasons. 
The State goes on to contend that "because the measurement of uncertainty was 
typewritten on [Mr.] Jones's lab report, the Standard Operating Procedures were, in fact, 
followed." (Resp. Br., p.18.) This argument, if accepted, would mean that the 
requirements in the standard operating procedures (and therefore Subsection (4)'s 
requirements) are nothing more than an exercise in futility-something the labs must do 
for no reason at all. It also ignores that, according to the standard operating 
procedures, the measurement of uncertainty "is crucial to the legal system because it 
impacts if and how an individual will be charged with an offense such as a DUI." 
(R., p.116.) Again, this only highlights the disconnect between Elias-Cruz's erroneous 
interpretation of Subsection (4) and Subsection (4) itself. 
Finally, the State asserts that the measurement of uncertainty is irrelevant 
because "it could not have established the reliability of the testing procedure." 
(Resp. Br., p.18.) As an initial matter, the State's argument rests on the erroneous 
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that the measurement of uncertainty would only be relevant if it could 
Jones 
does testing 
Instead, the measurement of uncertainty gives the full picture-the range of values, 
each of which is just as likely as the other to be the true value of the thing that is 
measured. The measurement of uncertainty 
incorporates, reconceptualizes, and expands upon error analysis. . . . 
[M]easurement uncertainty ... is a quantifiable parameter in the realm of 
the state of knowledge about nature. The objective of measurement 
uncertainty is not to approximate a quantity's value as closely as possible 
but to characterize our state of knowledge about a quantity's value. 
Ted Vosk, Measurement Uncertainty: Requirement for Admission of Forensic Science 
Evidence, in Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Science, 3-4 (A. Jamieson and A. 
Moenssens eds., 2015) (internal endnote and quotation marks omitted). For this 
reason, the standard operating procedures provide: 
In the analysis of forensic specimens, we do not know the true value for 
the specimen; hence, this information is not the error associated with the 
analysis. Rather, it is a range of values likely to be encountered during 
the measurement process. This information is crucial to the legal system 
because it impacts if and how an individual will be charged with an offense 
such as a DUI. 
(R., p.116 (emphasis added).) The measurement of uncertainty thus reflects the fact 
that Mr. Jones's test result of .207 means that his actual alcohol concentration may be 
as low as. 196 or as high as .217, and that it is equally likely that his actual alcohol 
concentration is 196, .207, or .217. (R., p.92; PSI, p.55.) 
The State's arguments, much like Elias-Cruz, turn on its incorrect interpretation 
of the 1987 amendments. That interpretation conflates the actual effect of the 
amendments (which removed the requirement that breath and urine results be 
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results) with something only Elias-Cruz (the false 
a 
from a 
concentration irrelevant). The plain language of I.C. § 18-8004C(2) and Subsection (4), 
the internal inconsistencies created by Elias-Cruz, and the express legislative purpose 
of those amendments further shows that the State's and Elias-Cruz's reading of the 
1987 amendments is incorrect. The State has not and cannot square all of those 
elements with its reading of the DUI statutes, while Mr. Jones's reading accounts for 
each and every one of them. Elias-Cruz is manifestly wrong and must be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court overturn Elias-Cruz, vacate 
Mr. Jones's judgment of conviction, reverse the district court's orders granting the 
State's motion in limine and denying his motion for reconsideration, and order that the 
district court admit the measurement of uncertainty at trial. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015. 
MAYA P\: 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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